Category Archives: Rhetoric

Notes on Reading Philosophy

“The primary problem isn’t that North Atlantic philosophers don’t read Africana thinkers and theorists; the deeper problem is that they don’t know how to read them.”
— Omedi Ochieng

“An important fact which many philosophers often forget is that the level of success of a project in philosophy can only be adequately determined when a critic has a clear understanding of the primary challenge a colleague sets out to meet.”
— Sophie Oluwole,”Oruka’s Mission in African Philosophy”

“Paul Grice use to say that we “should treat great and dead philosophers as we treat great and living philosophers, as having something to say to us.” That is fine, so long as it is not assumed that what the dead have to say to us is much the same as what the living have to say to us. Unfortunately, this is probably what was being assumed by those who, in the heyday of confidence in what was being called the “analytic history of philosophy,” encouraged us to read something written by Plato “as though it had come out in Mind last month” – an idea which, if it means anything at all, means something that destroys the main philosophical point of reading Plato at all.”
— Bernard Williams, “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline”)

“Questions that, alas, I don’t see often enough from a certain kind of philosopher: How should I read this? What is the background against which this speech act is emergent? What is this utterance’s (asymptotic) horizon? Who is being addressed and why?”
–Omedi Ochieng

“What theorem out of Africa?”: What George Steiner’s Racist Rage Teaches Us About Conservative Ideology

There’s a certain kind of academic who likes to cite George Steiner to the effect that knowledge of Goethe, or a delight in Rilke doesn’t make a person any less likely to be barbaric. And yet the strongest argument for that position has always been Steiner himself, not least because his visceral racism and palpable misogyny have flourished in a historical milieu when the humanities have produced some of the most far-reaching, stringent inquiries into the relationship of high culture to moral sadism. In that sense, Steiner’s skepticism is no different from the gushing encomiums to intellectual supremacy espoused by most of his academic colleagues – “philosophers are skeptical and dangerous to the status quo!” “Those who graduate with English degrees are empathetic and cosmopolitan!” – for, despite their varying affective registers, they function as roundabout ways by which the speaker transitively, insidiously congratulates himself.

Consider, for example, Steiner’s space clearing remarks as he launches into his study of the rhetoric of philosophy in his book, The Poetry of Thought:

The incandescence of intellectual and poetic creativity in mainland Greece, Asia Minor and Sicily during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. remains unique in human history. In some respects, the life of the mind thereafter is a copious footnote. So much has long been obvious. Yet the causes of this sunburst, the motives which brought it about in that time and place remain unclear. The penitential “political correctness” now prevalent, the remorse of postcolonialism make it awkward even to pose what may be the pertinent questions, to ask why the ardent wonder that is pure thought prevailed almost nowhere else (what theorem out of Africa?).

Manifold and complex factors must have been interactive, “implosive” to borrow a crucial concept from the packed collisions in atomic physics. Among these were a more or less benign climate and ease of maritime communication. Argument traveled fast; it was, in the ancient and figural sense, “Mercurial.” The availability of protein, cruelly denied to so much of the sub-Saharan world, may have been pivotal. Nutritionists speak of protein as “brain food.” Hunger, malnutrition lame the gymnastics of the spirit. There is much we do not yet grasp, though Hegel sensed its central role, concerning the daily ambience of slavery, concerning the incidence of slavery on individual and social sensibility. It is, however, evident that for the privileged, and they were relatively numerous, the ownership of slaves comported leisure and dispensation from manual and domestic tasks. It bestowed time and space for the free play of intellect. This is an immense license. Neither Parmenides nor Plato needed to earn a living. Under temperate skies, a nourished man could proceed to argue or to listen in the agora, in the groves of the Academy.

The third element is the most difficult to evaluate. With stellar exceptions, women played a housebound, often subservient part in the affairs, certainly in the philosophic-rhetorical affairs of the polis. Some may have had access to higher education. But there is little evidence prior to Plotinus. Did this (enforced, traditional?) abstention contribute to the luxury and even arrogance of the speculative? Does it reach, via the arrestingly modest contribution to mathematics and metaphysics made by women, into our own, now metamorphic day? Protein, slavery, male prepotence: what was their cumulative causation in the Greek miracle? For let us be clear: a miracle it was.
— George Steiner, The Poetry of Thought

What is notable here, I think, isn’t the vulgarity of the racism and sexism. As pointed out above, it shouldn’t by now be news to us (though it is no less appalling, of course) that the racism of intellectuals like Steiner proves to be the usual banal fare available from Fox News and the Daily Mail, a coagulation of folk science, modern myths and legends about ancient Greece, and a “Great Books + Classical Music” cultural fetish.

Rather, what I find striking here is how strenuously Steiner strives to pack in as many “politically incorrect” slurs as he can manage in two paragraphs. One would almost be forgiven for thinking this a Sokal-like, reverse hoax of what a cultural studies type imagines conservative thought to be like; so determined is he to check off every space in his bingo checklist of imagined “intersectional” foes of conservative thought. Racism: “what theorem out of Africa?” no doubt a deliberate echo of Saul Bellow’s “Who is the Tolstoy of the Zulus? The Proust of the Papuans?” Ableism: “Hunger, malnutrition lame the gymnastics of the spirit.” Class domination and brutality: “There is much we do not yet grasp, though Hegel sensed its central role, concerning the daily ambience of slavery, concerning the incidence of slavery on individual and social sensibility.” Misogyny: “With stellar exceptions, women played a housebound, often subservient part in the affairs, certainly in the philosophic-rhetorical affairs of the polis.”

It is this breathless, flailing litany of invective that I think may tell us something useful about conservative thought. I mean here, specifically, not only the white rage that it bespeaks, the desperation and rancid resentment simmering to a boil just beneath Steiner’s rococo prose, but also how that rage is constituted by phantasms, visions, nightmares summoned precisely by their very telling. In other words, the phantasms generative of conservative rage and resentment are constitutive of – rather than only or primarily reactions to – observations made about an “objective,” “external” reality.

This carries certain implications not only for a hermeneutic adequate to understanding conservative thought, but also a praxis attentive to its energies. The political theorist Corey Robin has offered one of the most penetrating accounts of how we ought to understand conservativism’s unifying vision. And yet if what I have argued above is correct, one of the implications he has been at pains to draw out and elaborate about the Trump era increasingly appears questionable. In a review of Robin’s book in the Los Angeles Review of Books, Lily Geismer offers a particularly helpful distillation of this dimension of Robin’s thesis:

“In a somewhat counterintuitive argument, Robin argues that the weaknesses and instability of the Trump administration and the Republicans on Capitol Hill are a result of conservatism’s past successes, and proof that that it is on the decline. The decline of conservatism as an intellectual tradition — its increasing instability, incoherence, and irresponsibility — has occurred, in Robin’s opinion, less because of Trump’s furious tweet storms and doctrinal sloppiness and more because the right does not have a credible left to borrow from and react against. Over the last half-century, he argues, conservatives have been so successful at thwarting emancipatory movements that now it has nothing to unify it. Although Robin does acknowledge the achievements of Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and the Bernie Sanders campaign, he believes that none of these movements are strong enough to truly galvanize and discipline the right.”

What Robin’s argument appears to presuppose is that the right is animated by a more or less realistic judgment of the balance of forces arrayed against it; that conservativism gains its coherence and discipline from the pressure exerted by an actually existing vibrant, credible left. This fails to account for the fantastical visions that have often galvanized and unified the right – terrors of conspiracy plotting by the enslaved, moral panics around sexuality and gender, Islamophobic fever dreams of Dhimmitude and Sharia. Even more crucially, Robin’s account does not register the extent to which the very marrow of “race,” “gender,” “sexuality,” really, the very marrow of politics, economics, and culture, are significantly – though of course not completely – constituted by fantasy and myth (“witchcraft” and “racecraft”).

Modern Historiography, Narrativity, Moralism

Hayden White:

Historians do not have to report their truths about the real world in narrative form; they may choose other, non-narrative, even anti-narrative, modes of representation, such as the meditation, the anatomy, or the epitome. Tocqueville, Burckhardt, Huizinga, and Braudel, to mention only the most notable masters of modern historiography, refused narrative in certain of their historiographical works, presumably on the assumption that the meaning of the events with which they wished to deal did not lend itself to representation in the narrative mode. They refused to tell a story about the past, or, rather, they did not tell a story with well-marked beginning, middle, and end phases; they did not impose upon the processes that interested them the form that we normally associate with storytelling. While they certainly narrated their accounts of the reality that they perceived, or thought they perceived, to exist within or behind the evidence they had examined, they did not narrativize that reality, did not impose upon it the form of a story. And their example permits us to distinguish between a historical discourse that narrates, on the one side, and a discourse that narrativizes, on the other; between a discourse that openly adopts a perspective that looks out on the world and reports it and a discourse that feigns to make the world speak itself and speak itself as a story.

Once we have been alerted to the intimate relationship that Hegel suggests exists between law, historicality, and narrativity, we cannot but be struck by the frequency with which narrativity, whether of the fictional or the factual sort, presupposes the existence of a legal system against or on behalf of which the
typical agents of a narrative account militate. And this raises the
suspicion that narrative in general, from the folktale to the novel, from the annals to the fully realized “history,” has to do with the topics of law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally authority.And indeed, when we look at what is supposed to be the next stage in the evolution of historical representation after the annals form, that is, the chronicle, this suspicion is borne out. The more historically self-conscious the writer of any form of historiography, the more the question of the social system and the law which sustains it, the authority of this law and its justification, and threats to the law occupy his attention. If, as Hegel suggests, historicality as a distinct mode of human existence is unthinkable without the presupposition of a system of law in relation to which a specifically legal subject could be constituted, then historical self-consciousness, the kind of consciousness capable of imagining the need to represent reality as a history, is conceivable only in terms of its interest in law, legality, legitimacy, and so on.

Interest in the social system, which is nothing other than a system of human relationships governed by law, creates the possibility of conceiving the kinds of tensions, conflicts, struggles, and their various kinds of resolutions that we are accustomed to find in any representation of reality presenting itself to us as a history. Perhaps, then, the growth and development of historical consciousness which is attended by a concomitant growth and development of narrative capability (of the sort met with in the chronicle as against the annals form) has something to do with the extent to which the legal system functions as a subject of concern. If every fully realized story, however we define that familiar but conceptually elusive entity, is a kind of allegory, points to a moral, or endows events, whether real or imaginary, with a significance that they do not possess as a mere sequence, then it seems possible to conclude that every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events of which it treats. Where there is ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the status of the legal system, which is the form in which the subject encounters most immediately the social system in which he is enjoined to achieve a full humanity, the ground on which any closure of a story one might wish to tell about a past, whether it be a public or a private past, is lacking. And this suggests that narrativity, certainly in factual storytelling and probably in fictional storytelling as well, is intimately related to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality, that is, to identify it with the social system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine.

(Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality”)